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124 Regional Trade Agreements were notified to the GATT during the period 1948-1994. Since 
1995, over 130 agreements have been notified to the WTO. Using empirical evidence, this paper 
proposes a way of measuring levels of regional integration and examines several potential 
explanations for the existence of different levels of regional economic integration.  Using a 
database of regional integration where levels of integration are ranked across countries, a probit 
analysis in a discrete choice framework is applied.  Common traits influencing regional 
integration decision-making were examined to determine those most influential. It is concluded 
that democracy and economic freedom, are significant contributors to the chosen level of 
regional integration. The role of political and economic uncertainty is examined and it is found 
that trade uncertainty is also a significant contributing factor. 
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1. Introduction  
 
  The fall of the Berlin Wall precipitated a shift in the motivation of those countries 
considering the possibility of integrating regionally as alliances shifted dramatically from the 
Cold War based bi-polar regime to a new multi-polar regime. In the last several years, more 
regional integration arrangements (RIA) have been notified to the WTO than in the entire history 
of the GATT. As seen in Figure 1, there have been 130 notifications since 1995 versus 124 
during the period 1948-1994. Schiff (2000) has examined the proliferation of Free Trade 
Agreements (FTA) and Customs Unions (CU) and found that the ratio of FTAs to CUs has 
increased in the 1990's, particularly in the case of North-South agreements.
2 Furthermore, the 
characteristics of RIA’s have also shifted. Ferdandez and Portes (1998) note that Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTA) have not only increased in number but have also deepened and widened. 
  A search for an explanation of the proliferation of RIAs has led to the conclusion that 
more than the traditional gains from trade are provided by the establishment of these types of 
organizations. Whalley (1998) depicted RTAs as insurance arrangements. Perroni and Whalley 
(2000) argued that regional trade agreements (RTA) are sought by small countries as protection 
against a global trade war. Wu (2002) has shown a potential explanation to be that the formation 
of regional integration agreements may aid in reducing risks and uncertainty associated with 
foreign transactions, thereby leading to expanded trade and investment. As the world shifted 
away from the Cold War alliance regime, the resulting uncertainty encouraged the formation of 
regional integration agreements.  
  Much empirical work has been done in the context of customs unions and FTAs. This 
work is generally divisible into two groups: computable general equilibrium models of trade and 
                                                 
2 “North” is considered industrially developed while “South” is considered to be less developed.   3 
trade policy; and econometric analysis of the impact of trade flows. In most cases, FTA 
formation is taken to be exogenous. In contrast to this literature, Bergstrand and Baier (2003) 
systematically look at the economic factors that influence the likelihood of pairs forming an 
FTA. Looking solely at these economic characteristics, the empirical model they develop is able 
to correctly predict 85% of the number of existing FTAs in the year 1996. Mansfield, Milner, and 
Rosendorff (2002) empirically find that pairs of democratic countries are roughly four times as 
likely to form a preferential trade agreement. The empirical literature, however, has not 
generalized to all forms of regional integration, nor have non-economic and economic 
characteristics been systematically examined together. Recognizing the fact that one explanation 
may not apply to recent RIA proliferation, it is essential to examine the conditions under which 
such arrangements come into existence.  
  This paper commences a discussion of whether there are certain characteristics, economic 
and/or political, that contribute to the probability of a country joining a particular regional 
integration arrangement. A correct hypothesis depends on the ability to isolate relevant 
characteristics of member states. Are there common traits among RIAs? If so, what 
characteristics influence the respective level of RIA participation? Economic and institutional 
development characteristics are examined with particular attention.  
  This paper thus has two objectives. The first is to isolate those common traits of RIAs and 
define contributing characteristics. Second, is to test explicitly whether economic and/or political 
uncertainty is a positive contributor to the chosen level of trade integration. Four general 
measures of uncertainty are used in this paper: trade uncertainty, political uncertainty, business 
cycle uncertainty, and price uncertainty. The various measures used are described in detail in 
Section 3.   4 
  In addition, this paper provides a more complete empirical test using the different levels 
of RIA participation. Data on regional integration has not been previously gathered in a 
systematic manner. A database of regional integration was developed which ranks the levels of 
integration across countries.
3 Using this database, a probit model is developed and tested where 
the level of regional integration is the dependent variable.  
  The findings of this paper are that democracy, geographic characteristics, membership in 
multilateral organizations, per capita income, economic freedom, and trade openness, are 
significant contributors to the chosen level of regional integration. Per capita income is a good 
indicator of whether a country increases its level of integration, as defined in  Figure 2 . 
Furthermore, global trade regime uncertainty does positively contribute to the level of regional 
integration.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the regional integration 
data set, describes the other data and the main hypothesis. Section 3 explores the probit model. 
Section 4 summarizes the estimation results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 Data and Hypothesis  
2.1 A Dataset of Regional Integration Levels 
  The data set of regional integration specifies a natural ordering of regional integration 
levels. These ranks are sequential  – economic union is not established without first passing 
through a customs union.
4 In addition, the step between a free trade area and a customs union is 
not comparable to the step between a customs union and an economic union. These different 
levels are presented in Figure 2. 
                                                 
3 Wu (2001). 
4 Recent work, e.g., Bird and Rajan (2002), confirms the ordering of the choice of levels of economic integration.   5 
  I construct an ordered index using the categories described in Figure 2. These rankings 
are described below. A  regional integration agreement (RIA) covers all of these different 
arrangements including those involving countries w here members are not all from the same 
geographic region.  
•  Sectoral trading agreements are very limited. They may be thought of as reflecting trade 
cooperation rather than actual integration. Sectoral cooperation limits the agreement to 
well-defined sectors such as grain or steel. Sectoral trading is coded as level one 
integration. 
•  Preferential trade agreements or areas (PTA) require participants to eliminate or lower 
tariffs on each other’s imports. Participants are allowed to retain the ability to determine 
the existence and the level of restrictions to be imposed on non-members. Typically, a 
free trade area (FTA) involves zero tariffs between member states, although usually only 
extended to selected goods and services. Both PTAs and FTAs are coded as the second 
level of regional integration although PTAs are not admissible under WTO rules. PTAs 
are considered shelters for inefficient industries in the member countries and are viewed 
as harming nonmember countries due to the economic loss incurred when parties to the 
agreement divert trade to themselves and exclude outsiders. 
•  Customs unions (CU) are similar to FTAs except that participating countries agree to 
adopt uniform import tariffs and common restrictions to outside countries in the form of a 
common external tariff (CET). The creation of the CET aids in the negation of trade 
deflection and rules of origin issues. The establishment of the CET implies some form of 
common decision-making and the development of common institutions to aid in the 
regulation of common trade interests and the redistribution of the CET revenue. The CET   6 
is the defining factor of a customs union which is coded level three of regional 
integration. 
 
•  Common markets (CM) require a much greater degree of political and economic 
cooperation than the three previously discussed arrangements. The free movement of the 
factors of production characterizes a common market. In order to ensure competition on a 
level playing field, these agreements are often complemented with the harmonization of 
policies in health and safety, social security, and education. Free movement of factors is 
thus the key attribute of this type of RIA which is coded as level four. 
 
•  An Economic union (EU) reflects a higher and increasingly complex level of regional 
cooperation. The addition of monetary and fiscal harmonization requires the formation of 
supranational institutions and organizations that typically have binding decision-making 
power over the members. An EU also presupposes common taxation and other common 
procedures. While there is increased political unification in an EU, the individual 
sovereign states maintain their separate identities. Only the European Union countries 
participating in the European Monetary Union have attained this level, level five.  
•  A Supra-national union covers both the political and the economic realms. Member 
states abandon goals of preserving national sovereignty. An example of this type of 
unification is the United States or the unification of East and West Germany, i.e., a 
federation. The Supra-national union is not included in the current data set. 
Each country was coded with only the highest level of RIA in which it participates. For example, 
Botswana, a member of the fledgling Southern African Development Community, is also a 
member of the South African Customs Union and thus is coded with a 3 for the latter customs 
union membership – the highest level of RIA in which it participates. The data set therefore   7 
captures the deepest form of regional integration to which a country belongs.
5 Monetary union in 
this framework, unfortunately, is unable to be distinguished from common market integration. 
This poses a problem when coding the CFA zones in West and Central Africa. Thus, the highest 
level of trade integration is taken and monetary union will not override the existence of the FTA 
in the case of West and Central Africa.  
  150 countries were included in the dataset. Inclusion was based on available data. Figure 
3 shows the evolution of the levels of regional integration in the sample. The former Soviet 
Union and Russia are not included. Various political issues make the coding of the U.S.S.R. 
difficult.
6 The majority of the ten European Union Accession Countries are included from 1989 
forward. If a country’s membership in a particular type of regional integration agreement could 
not be verified to have attained significance using the criteria outlined above, its membership in 
the RIA was not included.  
 
2.2 Factors Influencing RIA Formation 
2.2.1 Measures of Uncertainty 
  One objective of this paper is to investigate how greater political and economic 
uncertainty has provided an incentive for countries to increase their participation in regional 
integration arrangements. The change in the global structure of trading alliances, brought on by 
the end of the Cold War, lead countries to seek multilateral agreements in an attempt to alleviate 
augmented risks. Furthermore, the supra-national institution governing dispute settlement, the 
                                                 
5 This is unfortunate since only one part (the deepening effect) of RIA formation is able to be studied. Future studies 
may wish to take into account the multi-RIA participation aspect. 
6 Other data for the former Soviet Union are also unavailable.   8 
WTO, emerged in 1995. Four measures of uncertainty are examined in this paper: trade 
uncertainty, political uncertainty, business cycle uncertainty, and price uncertainty.  
  Trade uncertainty can be measured through a country’s openness in terms of exports 
and imports as a ratio of gross domestic product (GDP). Rodrik (1987) has argued that the more 
open a country is to international trade, the more uncertainty is created for participants in the 
economy.
7 Openness to international trade is associated with uncertainty because a country with 
a higher proportion of international trade dependence is more likely to have its terms of trade 
adversely affected by the international community. Since countries may choose trade integration 
as a method to mitigate risks associated with trade, we expect there to be a positive relationship 
between trade openness and RIA formation. 
  There are several measures of trade openness. The traditional measure of trade openness, 
from the Penn World Tables 6, is the ratio of imports and exports to GDP.
8 A second measure, 
taken from the World Bank, uses tariffs measured by import duties as a percentage of total 
imports. A third measure, the Trade & Openness Index (TOI), published by Economic Freedom 
of the World (EFW), is designed to measure the degree to which countries’ policies interfere 
with international exchange. In contrast to the more traditional measures, there are four basic 
components to this index: tariff rates; the black-market exchange premium; restrictions on capital 
movement; and the actual size of the trade sector as compared to the expected size. This index 
was derived for 109 countries in 1998 and slightly fewer in previous years. It is only available for 
                                                 
7 Rodrik posits that to combat the uncertainty generated by a more open economy, social spending should increase. 
8 This measure has several theoretical difficulties, but here the problems help generate the sought after measure. One 
problem with using the imports and exports ratio is that it mitigates the importance of services in the economy since 
trade is usually high in merchandise. A way around this would be to weight the openness ratio by services, however, 
here, we hypothesize that high service sectors are an additional measure of development and thus, low openness 
ratios may also indicate that an economy is not as susceptible to uncertainty due to shifts in the international trade 
regime. This is true for the United States, which has a low openness ratio and a low probability of being affected by 
international trade instability.   9 
the later part of the 1990's. In 1998, the highest-ranking countries were Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Estonia, Belgium, Ireland, Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg. As with the traditional 
measure of openness, a positive relationship between this index and levels of regional integration 
is expected. 
Political uncertainty may be measured in a number of ways. Two potential measures, one 
of corruption and another of economic freedom, are presented. The first measure is the level of 
corruption in a country. High levels of corruption make it more likely that countries try to use 
regional integration agreements to end trade risks brought about by the capricious behavior of 
domestic government representatives. The corruption index published by Transparency 
International is a constructed ranking where the purpose is to assess the corruption level of 52 
countries as perceived by businesspeople, risk analysts, and the general public. The perceptions 
of this group may not always be a fair reflection of the actual state of affairs and does not 
necessarily reflect the concrete level of corruption in the surveyed countries and thus, due to its 
subjectivity, trends are difficult to determine. High levels of corruption, and therefore greater 
political uncertainty, should provide a positive incentive for regional integration. 
  The second potential measure of political uncertainty is the index of economic freedom. 
This index provides a higher rating for those countries with institutions and policies consistent 
with price stability, the rule of law and secure property rights, smaller governments, and free 
trade. Freer trade is defined as lower tariffs and fewer non-tariff barriers consistent with regional 
integration. The EFW index relies on quantitative variables to develop its rating gradations for 
each component.
9 Institutional improvement has been shown to be a prerequisite for growth and 
                                                 
9 In contrast, the Heritage Index relies on qualitative evaluations used to assign component ratings to each country. 
While the Heritage Index rates slightly more countries, the EFW index provides a more objective figure and is 
therefore the preferred measure in this paper.   10 
development and thus more secure trade. Institutional development is expected to be positively 
related to regional integration as countries secure property rights and continue to deepen their 
levels of regional integration.  
  Several other ways of measuring political stability presented themselves. None were 
significant. One way is using the mean number of revolutions. Another measure of stability is 
based upon the integrity of central bank policies. While both were initially included in the 
ordered probit analysis, neither was a significant indicator of the level of regional integration and 
therefore are not reported in the results section.
10 
  Business cycle uncertainty is another type of uncertainty contributing to greater levels of 
regional integration. There is risk associated with the general health of the economy for 
individual producers as they are subject to the vicissitude of their domestic environment. A more 
open economy may expose a country to the vagary of other countries business cycles; however 
by joining a RIA, the country may also afford itself of the opportunity to take advantage of the 
“portfolio effect” of all these business cycles and thus reap the benefits of more stable production 
and income. Indeed, Mattli (1999) finds that downturns in business cycles spur the formation of 
cooperative agreements. Furthermore, there is growing evidence that volatility is positively 
correlated with the rate of growth (this includes most Western European countries). Business 
cycle uncertainty is generally measured using GDP growth, calculated from t to t+1, as a rough 
measure of year-to-year uncertainty. GDP comes from the Penn World Tables 6 data. We expect 
a negative relationship between positive GDP growth and the level of RIA. 
                                                 
10 Revolutions and coups and central bank dependence have also been shown in the macroeconomic literature to be 
strongly associated with average inflation rates.   11 
  Price uncertainty is proxied with inflation rates. It has been shown that average inflation 
rates are lower in more open economies.
11 Inflation rates are often used as measure of domestic 
instability, soundness of economic policies, and as a reflection of the importance of international 
markets. Global financial markets interact on a daily basis. It serves to discipline those countries 
in the developing world with extremely high inflation rates and thus discourages the adoption of 
domestic policies which promote price uncertainty. Inflation is measured as changes in the 
personal consumption price levels of each country. All data come from the Penn World Tables 6 
and are on an annual basis and are PPP measures adjusted for the exchange rate.  
Thus far we have examined the various measures of uncertainty. In order to proceed 
further, we still need to present other data to be used as the control variables.  
 
2.2.2 Other Data  
Democracy 
  It is the practice of the European Union to forbid membership until the applying country 
has fulfilled three conditions:  It must be a functioning market economy, have a democratic 
political system, and accept the acquis communautaire. A country is thus required to obtain a 
certain level of institutional and economic development before it is accepted as a European 
Union member. The importance of institutional development was discussed in the section on 
political uncertainty. Whether a country is a democracy is a measurable characteristic. As 
previously cited, there is evidence in the political economy literature that democracies are more 
                                                 
11 E.g., Romer (1993).   12 
inclined to join a RTA.
12 Democracy is measured on a 0-10 scale and is the institutionalized 
democracy score given in the Polity IV dataset.  
  A second measure for institutional development, highly correlated with democracy, is the 
measure for polity, also from the Polity IV dataset. Polity is measured on a -10 to +10 scale 
where -10 is autocracy and +10 is democracy. The correlation between polity and democracy is 
almost 1 to 1. 
 
Country Characteristics and Income 
  To control for country specific characteristics, several geographic indicators are used: 
population, land area, a dummy variable for whether a country is landlocked, and a dummy 
variable for whether a country is an island nation. A  measure for remoteness is also used. 
Remoteness is defined as the inverse of the log(distance to nearest trading partner/GDP).
13 As a 
further defining characteristic, I create dummy variables for a country’s participation in the 
OECD and the IMF. GATT/WTO participation is not included because the relationship with RIA 
formation is almost 1 to 1. Membership in other multilateral organizations is a suitable 
instrument for multilateral participation. If participation in the multilateral system is important, 
as hypothesized, we would expect positive relationships b etween membership in such 
establishments and participation in a RIA.  
Per capita GDP is also included as a control variable since per capita income is a good 
economic indicator of a country’s development level and potential partner countries may choose 
                                                 
12 See Rosendorff (2002), Mansfield et al. (2002). 
13 Data on r emoteness, total land area, and total population, as well as some of the other political uncertainty 
measures,  were graciously provided by Andrew Rose and are located on his website at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose/RecRes.htm. Rose, interestingly, found very little significant relationship 
between WTO membership, trade liberalization, and RTA membership.   13 
not to invite less developed countries to join an existing RIA. Finally, although per capita income 
should theoretically have a positive relationship with the levels of regional integration, there is 
also the possibility of reverse causality. When countries liberalize their trade, often as a result of 
joining an RIA, levels of trade increase and as a result the per capita income of a country also 
improves. Certain levels of per capita income as well as the development of stable institutions 
may be required of countries seeking to join already existing RIAs. The result is that countries 
interested in joining RIAs or deepening their commitments will follow policies designed to 
enhance these aspects and causation is the reverse of the hypothesis. A way to remove the reverse 
causality problem is to use instrumental variable estimation techniques. Unfortunately, the 
ordered probit model is far from ideal for instrumental variable estimation. As estimation 
techniques improve, future assessment of this difficulty may be possible.
14 GDP per capita is 
calculated from data provided by the Penn World Tables. The reported results use terms of trade 
adjusted per capita GDP. I now turn to a description of the model. 
 
3 Model Specification  
3.1 The Basic Model  
  As noted, nearly every country in the world is a member of, or in the process of 
discussing membership in, one or more regional integration arrangements.
15 From Figures 1 and 
3, it is apparent that increasing numbers of countries have made a multinomial choice. Thus, in 
                                                 
14 The endogeneity issue has been partially addressed by Baier and Bergstrand (2003). 
15 http://www.wto.org. Agreements concluded among developing countries account for 15% of the total number of 
notified agreements to the WTO.   14 
any one year, a country chooses between sectoral cooperation, a free trade agreement, a customs 
union, or a common market.
16  
When the outcomes are clearly ordered, we should take into account that the dependent 
variable is both discrete and ordinal (as in this case). We cannot use linear regression to identify 
the causal relationship between RIA levels and explanatory characteristics since it would treat the 
difference between sectoral cooperation and PTA as identical to the difference between a 
customs union and a common market. This is obviously not the case. Under this setting, the most 
commonly used and most appropriate estimation technique is either an ordered probit or an 
ordered logit model. Here, I choose to estimate an ordered probit model.
17 
Regarding the level of regional integration, a country follows a specific set of steps to 
institutionally develop the framework necessary to support first a free trade agreement, and then 
a customs union.
18  In addition, the data leads us to infer that the dependent, ranked, levels of 
regional integration reflect an underlying qualitative variable, i.e., the chosen level of 
cooperation. Therefore an ordered probit estimation is more suitable than that of ordered logit. 
  Given the characteristics of a country: income, measures of uncertainty, its institutions 
and geography, we endeavor to estimate the probabilities that this country chooses a given level 
of regional integration. A three-way choice of regional integration, i.e., sectoral cooperation, 
                                                 
16 Since the data are only through 1998, economic union is not a choice as it did not become effective for the 
European Union until 1999. 
17 The difference between the ordered logit and ordered probit models lies in the assumed distribution of error terms. 
In practice, there is no significance difference between the two results. I estimate the ordered probit model because 
with the current data, the implications of the exercise are more readily explained. 
18 Exceptions are the Central and West African Monetary Unions, two groups of former French colonies who have 
had their currencies tied to the French Franc (CFA) since independence. Although, the WAMU has been 
characterized by some trade integration, it lacks a common external tariff and its trade liberalization program is ad 
hoc with each member determining its own degree of protection. Sectoral cooperation was thus determined to be the 
overall level of regional trade integration.   15 
FTA, or customs union, is modeled by an ordered probit model where the latent, or unobserved, 
continuous variable, 
*
i Y is a linear combination of the form: 
 
*
iii Yx be ¢ =+  
where â is a vector or unknown parameters to be estimated, xi is a vector of explanatory variables 
for country  i, e.g., the demographic and economic characteristics described in the previous 
sections, and ￿ i are independent normal disturbances with mean zero and unit variance. To 
estimate this model, we use maximum likelihood estimation. 
The observed discrete dependent variable,  Yi, takes on its lowest value (sectoral 
cooperation) if 
* 0 i Y £ , its medium value (FTA) if 
* 0 i Y t <£ , and its highest value (customs 
union) if 
*
i Y t < . Under the restriction that 0 < ô, this specification implies that: 

















where ô is the threshold value to be estimated and Ö is the standard normal cumulative 
distribution function.
19 Standard practice is to set the first threshold value to 0. Equation (2) 
above is interpreted as the probability of observing an FTA is equal to the probability that the 
estimated linear function, plus a random error, is within the range of the estimated threshold 
between 0 and ô. The constant in an ordered probit is set to zero.  
  There are several ways to interpret the results of the ordered probit. The signs and 
statistical significance of the coefficients present some information about the model. The 
absolute magnitude of the coefficient estimates has no meaning. The impact on the intermediate 
                                                 
19 For an example of a general ordered probit model, see Brownstone and Golub (1992) or Becker and Kennedy 
(1992). See also Greene (1997).   16 
classification value (FTA) of a change in the explanatory variables is indeterminate whereas on 
the lowest and highest, the impact is irrevocable. A positive signed coefficient indicates a 
decrease in the probability of the lower threshold and an increase in the probability of the higher 
threshold, i.e., the change in the likelihood of observing the first and last choices. The statistical 
significance thus indicates a relationship between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable, but it does not indicate the magnitude of the effect.  
  Two periods are examined: the overall period 1960-1998 and the later period 1987 -1998. 
Note that the latter, 11-year span, marks a decade of significant international changes: a large 
number of RTAs were notified to the WTO in the 1990s; the Cold War alliances dissolved; and a 
number of new countries formed. The results of the estimation are examined in Section 4 below. 
 
4 Results  
4.1 1960-1998 Estimates 
  The empirical analysis of levels of regional integration suggests that economic freedom 
and institutional development, while not conclusive, do play a role in the choice of regional 
integration agreement. Examining  Table 1 , both trade uncertainty, as measured using the 
traditional measure of openness, and democracy are positive and significant. This implies that 
increased trade uncertainty and the characteristic of democracy both contribute to the probability 
of a country choosing higher levels of regional integration.  
GDP per capita is also significant and positive. This implies that wealthier countries have 
a greater probability of belonging to a high level RIA. This result is brought about by the 
European Union. However, island nations are less likely to increase their level of RIA   17 
participation, as are large nations, while land-locked countries are positively correlated with a 
RIA. Population is also a positive and significant contributing factor. This implies that nations 
with large populations are more inclined to increase their level of RIA participation.  
When a tariff measure is instead used as a measure for trade uncertainty, it is significant 
at the 20% while all other variables retain their signs and their significance. It is important to 
note that when the Corruption Index from Transparency International is combined with the 
traditional measure of openness, neither measure is significant. This implies that either the 
combination of political and economic uncertainty does not contribute to a choice of RIA level, 
or there is significant collinearity. We rule out collinearity since the correlation coefficient is less 
than 50%. In addition, population and being a landlocked country are no longer significant.  
  Very high levels of political uncertainty may deter the ability of a government to be able 
to commit to participation in a RIA. In addition, governments may not have access to the 
resources necessary for the pursuit of new institutional constructs, i.e., membership in a RIA. 
However, none of the other measures of political uncertainty were significant.  
  Neither business cycle uncertainty nor price uncertainty is a significant contributing 
factor to the probability that a country increases its level of RIA participation. If the percent of 
government expenditure (size of government) is accounted for, trade uncertainty is also no longer 
significant. This result confirms the idea that countries expand social spending to help combat 
trade uncertainty as postulated by Rodrik (1987).  
However, when remoteness is included as a measure of distance between countries, it is 
negative and highly significant. Thus, remote countries are unlikely to form ‘deep’ RIAs as are 
island nations and those with large land areas combined with large populations. This implies that 
denser, more contiguous countries are more likely to form ‘deeper’ RIAs.    18 
Membership in a multilateral organization such as the IMF or the OECD is also positive 
and significant. This implies that countries who are members of multilateral organizations are 
more likely to join deeper levels of RIAs. Thus, multilateral participation as hypothesized, has 
become more significant and is important in the decision to join a RIA.  
 
4.2 1987-1998 Estimates  
  Are the characteristics of the last decade in the data significantly different from those of 
the overall period? Examining Table 2, we observe that most signs and significance levels are 
the same except for the traditional measure of trade openness; now insignificant as a measure of 
trade uncertainty. When the Trade & Openness Index (TOI) from EFW is used in the place of the 
traditional trade openness measure, it is negative and insignificant. Per capita GDP is significant 
and positive. However, when the TOI index and the traditional measure of trade openness are 
together in an order probit, neither are significant and both are negative. I interpret this as 
evidence that trade uncertainty alone had a modest impact on the increase in regional integration 
post-Cold War.  
  Price uncertainty and business cycle uncertainty are negative but not significant. 
Significance of business cycle and price uncertainty would positively contribute to the 
probability of belonging to a RIA; inferred to be a Latin American effect. However, per capita 
income, democracy, and the geographic characteristics seem to be better indicators of the 
probability of participation in a certain level of RIA in this later period.    19 
4.3 Bivariate Probit Estimates 
  In order to control for the possibility of bias due to presence of highly developed, 
industrial countries in deeper forms of RIA’s, the sample is collapsed to a bivariate probit model. 
In doing so, the RIA indicator is collapsed to a dummy variable where participation in a FTA or 
any higher level of regional integration is denoted by a 1. Sectoral cooperation is not considered 
a formal FTA and thus is coded with non-participation as a zero. The results are reported in 
Table 3. 
  Examining Table 3, it is immediately apparent that the results do not differ greatly from 
the ordered probit results for the same time period. All signs and significance levels remain the 
same except for tariffs, which are no longer significant. Now, we are able to conclude that the 
probability of joining a RIA is influenced by the democracy level as well as geographic 
characteristics. Only trade uncertainty as defined through the traditional trade openness measure, 
is of contributive importance to a country’s participation in a FTA or another form of regional 
integration arrangement. 
  Once again, we examine the post-1987 time period to investigate whether t here are 
significant differences in characteristics. From Table 4, it appears that in the Post Cold-War 
period, none of the four measures of uncertainty: trade, political, price or business cycle 
uncertainty, is a good indicator of whether a country will belong to an RIA. Per capita income 
seems to be a good indicator when other institutional development, as shown by the level of 
democracy, is taken into account. Geographic characteristics are evidently much less important 
in this period. None of the included geographic characteristics are consistently significant. This 
suggests that in this later time period, the other non-geographic factors were essential. In 
addition, it is clear that there is a difference between RIAs formed in the early and later periods.    20 
 
5 Conclusion  
  This paper had two objectives: first, to isolate those common traits of RIAs and define 
contributing characteristics. Secondly, to explicitly test for whether economic and/or political 
uncertainty is a positive contribution factor to the chosen level of trade integration. Four 
measures of uncertainty were tested: trade uncertainty; political uncertainty; business cycle 
uncertainty, and price uncertainty. As a result of the natural ordering of the regional integration 
data set, developed in this paper, an ordered probit maximum likelihood estimation was used to 
examine those factors which were likely to contribute to the probability that a country belongs to 
a regional integration agreement. Only trade uncertainty was of any significance. 
  This paper has provided a more complete empirical test to identify factors contributing to 
different levels of RIA participation. Using the level of regional integration as the dependent 
variable, a probit model was developed and tested. Data on regional integration has not been 
previously gathered in a systematic manner. A database of regional integration was developed 
which ranks the levels of integration across countries.  
  What are the characteristics of countries joining regional integration arrangements? High-
income, democratic countries with high populations who are landlocked and are not islands are 
more likely to belong to deeper levels of regional integration. It is expected that developing 
countries do not have solid institutions designed to support deep levels of RIA. This is reflected 
in the importance of democracy, a variable consistently significant across time. 
  High per capita income is a good indicator of countries belonging to higher levels of 
regional integration which may be referred to as a European Union effect. Per capita income is   21 
positive and statistically significant. From Table 4, it is apparent that when the ordered regional 
integration levels are collapsed into a binary system for the 1987-1998 period, with the exception 
of democracy and per capita income, most indicators no longer significantly contribute to 
enhance the probability that a country belongs to an RIA. This result signals that there has been a 
shift in country’s motivations. One plausible hypothesis is that the international community 
experienced a shift. This shift, in my opinion, is a result of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
subsequent end of the Cold War.  
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Figure 1 :Evolution of Regional Trade Agreements in the World 1948-2002 
Number of RTAS 
 
 
Source: WTO Secretariat, 2003  
 
 
Figure 2 : Types of Regional Integration Arrangements 




















Sectoral Cooperation (1)  ￿         
Preferential or  
Free Trade Area (2) 
￿         
Customs Union (3)  ￿  ￿       
Common Market (4)  ￿  ￿  ￿     
Economic Union (5)  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿   
Supra-national Union (na)  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
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Figure 3 








1965 1975 1985 1995
SC FTA CU CM Total 
 
The number of included regional integration arrangements in each year. There 
are a total of 102 multilateral arrangements in 1995. Note that the WTO counts 
each bilateral agreement whereas here, the entire regional integration 
arrangement is counted as one agreement. Sectoral Cooperation (SC), Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA), Customs Union (CU), and Common Market (CM). 
Participation is determined as outlined in Figure 2. Source: Own calculations.   27 
 
Table 1: Ordered Probit Regression Y= Regional Integration, 1960-1998 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 










































































Openness   0.142 
(0.031) 
    0.217 
(0.124) 
   
Tariffs    -0.008 ** 
(0.003) 
       
TI Corruption 
Index 




   
GDP growth          0.003 
(0.003) 
 
Inflation rate            -0.001 
(0.001) 
  N=4186  N=1976  N=327  N=329  N=4130  N=4132 
Note: Dependant variable is regional integration; ordered as described in the text. Openness is the log of 
exports and imports as a percent of GDP. The Corruption Index comes from Transparency International. 
Tarriffs are import duties as a percent of imports from the World Bank, WDI. Maximum likelihood estimation 
of ordered probit, four-way choice model. Bold face indicates p -value significance at 1%, 
* indicates 
significance at 10%.
 ** indicates significance at 20%.    28 
Table 2: Ordered Probit Regression 
Y= Regional Integration, 1987-1998 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 










































































Openness   0.069 
(0.057) 
         
Tariffs    -0.002 
(0.004) 
       
TI Corruption 
Index 
    0.002 
(0.043) 
     
GDP growth        -0.004 
(0.004) 
   
Inflation rate          -0.002 
(0.001) 
 
Trade Policy IEF            -0.046 
(0.051) 
  N=1459  N=934  N=279  N=1428  N=1430  N=456 
Note: Dependant variable is regional integration; ordered as described in the text. Openness is the log of 
exports and imports as a percent of GDP. The Corruption Index comes from Transparency International. 
Tarriffs are import duties as a percent of imports from the World Bank, WDI. Trade Policy measure comes 
from EFW. Maximum likelihood estimation of ordered probit, four-way choice model. Bold face indicates p 
value significance at 1%, 
* indicates significance at 10%.
 ** indicates significance at 20%.  
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Table 3: Bi-variate Probit Regression  
Y= Regional Integration, 1960-1998 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 






























































Openness   0.056 
(0.012) 
       
Tariffs    0.002 
(0.002) 
     
TI Corruption 
Index 
    -0.013 
(0.018) 
   
GDP growth        0.001 
(0.001) 
 
Inflation rate          0.00 
(0.00) 
  N=4186  N=1976  N=329  N=4130  N=4132 
Note: Dependant variable is regional integration. Openness is the log of exports and imports as a 
percent of GDP. The Corruption Index comes from Transparency International. Tarriffs are 
import duties as a percent of imports from the World Bank, WDI. Maximum likelihood 
estimation of bivariate probit.  Bold face indicates p -value significance at 1%, 
* indicates 
significance at 10%.
 ** indicates significance at 20%.  
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Table 4: Bi-variate Probit Regression  
Y= Regional Integration, 1987-1998 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 










































































Openness   -0.007 
(0.027) 
         
Tariffs    0.004 
(0.002) 
       
TI Corruption 
Index 
    -0.129 
(0.019) 
     
GDP growth        -0.001 
(0.002) 
   





          0.006 
(0.015) 
  N=1459  N=934  N=279  N=1428  N=1430  N=456 
Note: Dependant variable is regional integration. Openness is the log of exports and imports as a percent of 
GDP. The Corruption Index comes from Transparency International. Tarriffs are import duties as a percent of 
imports from the World Bank, WDI. Maximum likelihood estimation of bivariate probit.  Bold face indicates 
p-value significance at 1%, 
* indicates significance at 10%.
 ** indicates significance at 20%.  
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